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Robust Mean Field Linear-Quadratic-Gaussian Games
with Unknown L2-Disturbance∗
Jianhui Huang† and Minyi Huang‡
Abstract
This paper considers a class of mean field linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) games with model
uncertainty. The drift term in the dynamics of the agents contains a common unknown function. We
take a robust optimization approach where a representative agent in the limiting model views the
drift uncertainty as an adversarial player. By including the mean field dynamics in an augmented
state space, we solve two optimal control problems sequentially, which combined with consistent
mean field approximations provides a solution to the robust game. A set of decentralized control
strategies is derived by use of forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDE) and
shown to be a robust ε-Nash equilibrium.
1 Introduction
Mean field game theory provides an effective methodology for the analysis and strategy design in a
large population of players which are individually insignificant but collectively have strong impact (see
e.g. [24, 27, 28, 34]). A typical modeling analyzes a system of N players with mean field coupling
in their dynamics or costs, or both. The linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) framework is of particular
interest since it allows an explicit solution procedure. Consider a large population of N agents. The
dynamics of agent i are given by the stochastic differential equation (SDE)
dxi(t) = (Axi(t) +Bui(t) +Gx
(N)(t))dt+DdWi(t), t ≥ 0, (1)
where x(N) = (1/N)
∑N
i=1 xi denotes the mean field coupling term. The cost of agent i is given by
Ji(ui, . . . , uN ) = E
[ ∫ T
0
(
|xi − Γx(N) − η|2Q + uTi Rui
)
dt+ xTi (T )Hxi(T )
]
, (2)
where we denote |z|Q = (zTQz) 12 and the symmetric matrices Q ≥ 0,H ≥ 0 and R > 0. The LQG
modeling framework was first developed in [24, 27] to obtain a set of strategies (uˆ1, . . . , uˆN ) such that
each uˆi only uses the local sample path information of xi and some deterministic functions reflecting
the collective behavior of the agents and such that (uˆ1, . . . , uˆN ) is an ε-Nash equilibrium. There has
existed a substantial body of literature adopting the LQG framework [4, 7, 31, 35, 43, 47].
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For further literature, the reader is referred to [12, 13, 14, 20, 28, 32] for nonlinear diffusion based
games and the associated SDE analysis, [11, 34] for study of the coupled system of Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman (HJB) and Fokker-Planck equations, [6, 9, 26, 41, 42] for models containing a major player,
[8, 18] for time consistent strategies in mean field games, [52] for mean field oscillator games, [50]
for Markovian switching mean field games, [15] for application to Bertrand and Cournot equilibrium
models, and [1] for a related solution notion called stationary equilibrium where players optimize
assuming a steady-state long-run average for the empirical distribution of others’ states. For an
overview on mean field game theory, see [6, 10, 21].
Within the traditional research on games, there has existed a fair amount of literature on model
uncertainty. For an N player static game with finite action spaces and an uncertain payoff matrix, a
robust-optimization equilibrium is introduced in [2] where each player optimizes its worst case payoff
with respect to the uncertain set. A similar method is applied to hierarchical static games [22].
Robustness has been addressed in dynamic games as well. A linear-quadratic (LQ) game with system
parameter uncertainties is presented in [29], and the deviation from the Nash equilibrium is estimated
for a set of nominal strategies. Robust Nash equilibria are analyzed in [49] for an LQ game with an
unknown time-varying disturbance signal as an adversarial player. In the first case, a soft-constrained
game is solved where the cost includes a quadratic penalty term for the disturbance. The second case
introduces a hard constraint by specifying an L2 bound on the disturbance function. The work [30]
deals with stochastic games where the payoff and state transition probabilities contain uncertainty.
The solution is developed by letting each player solve a robust Markov decision problem to optimize
its worst case cost while other players’ strategies are fixed.
This paper aims to address model uncertainty in the mean field LQG game context. Specifically,
we focus on drift uncertainty by adding to (1) a common unknown L2-disturbance f . A practical
motivation is that in many decision problems, a large number of agents can share a common uncertainty
source fluctuating with time, and examples include taxation, subsidy, interest rates, and so on. A
direct consequence of our modeling is that this disturbance has global influence on the population.
To address robustness, each agent locally views the disturbance as an adversarial player, and for this
purpose we incorporate into (2) an effort penalty term for the disturbance which in turn maximizes
the resulting cost first. The agent minimizes subsequently. The framework of letting the disturbance
maximize while its effort is penalized is called the soft-constraint approach [5, 19, 49]. It has the
advantage of analytical tractability. When a hard constraint is considered, the robust mean field game
is more difficult to tackle; see some preliminary analysis in [25]. Regarding robustness in mean field
games, a related work is [46] where each agent is paired with its local disturbance as an adversarial
player. The resulting solution is to replace the usual HJB equation by a Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs (HJI)
equation in the solution.
To design the individual strategies it is necessary to build the dynamics of the mean field (i.e.
state average of the agents) evolving under the disturbance. This technique shares its spirit with the
state augmentation method in major player models [26, 41, 42]. The subsequent robust optimization
problem, as a minimax control problem, leads to two optimal control problems with indefinite state
weights [51]. They are different from the well known stochastic control problems with indefinite control
weights [17, 37]. We will follow a convex optimization approach to solve the two control problems via
variational analysis and forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDE) [23, 40, 44]. Both
the information structure and the solution procedure for our model are different from [46] where each
player and its local disturbance have access to its state and so dynamic programming is applicable.
Our main contributions are summarized as follows:
• We formulate a class of mean field LQG games where the players face a common uncertainty
source, and introduce the robust optimization approach to solve two convex optimal control
problems.
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• Decentralized strategies are obtained for the robust mean field game via a set of FBSDE.
• The performance of the decentralized strategies for the N players is characterized as a robust
ε-Nash equilibrium.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the mean field LQG game with
a common disturbance and defines the worst case cost for a player. Section 3 studies the limiting
robust optimization problem which leads to two optimal control problems solved sequentially by the
disturbance and the representative player. The solution equation system of the mean field game is
obtained in Section 4 based on consistent mean field approximations. A key error estimate of the
mean field approximation is developed in Section 5. Section 6 characterizes the set of decentralized
strategies as a robust ε-Nash equilibrium. An extension of the analysis to players with random initial
states is presented in Section 7, and Section 8 concludes the paper.
2 Mean Field LQG Games with Drift Uncertainty
Consider a finite time horizon [0, T ] for T > 0. Suppose that (Ω,F , {Ft}0≤t≤T ,P) is a complete filtered
probability space. Throughout this paper, we denote by Rk the k-dimensional Euclidean space, Rn×k
the set of all n × k matrices. We use | · | to denote the norm of a Euclidean space, or the Frobenius
norm for matrices. For a vector or matrix M , MT denotes its transpose. Let L2F (0, T ;R
k) denote
the space of all Rk-valued Ft-progressively measurable processes x(·) satisfying E
∫ T
0 |x(t)|2dt < ∞;
C([0, T ];Rk) (resp., C1([0, T ];Rk)) is the space of all Rk-valued functions h(·) defined on [0, T ] which
are continuous (resp., continuously differentiable); L2(0, T ;Rk) is the space of all Rk-valued measurable
functions h(·) on [0, T ] satisfying ∫ T0 |h(t)|2dt <∞, and we denote the norm ‖h‖L2 = (∫ T0 |h(t)|2dt)1/2.
Throughout the paper, we use C (or C1, C2, . . .) to denote a generic constant which does not depend
on the population size N and may vary from place to place.
2.1 The game with a finite population
Consider N agents (or players) denoted by Ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , respectively. The state xi of Ai is Rn-valued
and satisfies the linear SDE
dxi(t) = (Axi(t) +Bui(t) +Gx
(N)(t) + f(t))dt+DdWi(t), 1 ≤ i ≤ N, (3)
where x(N) = (1/N)
∑N
j=1 xj . The control ui takes its value in R
n1 . TheRn2-valued standard Brownian
motions {Wi(t), 1 ≤ i ≤ N} are independent. The initial states {xi(0), 1 ≤ i ≤ N} are deterministic
and their empirical mean has the limit limN→∞(1/N)
∑N
i=1 xi(0) = m0. We take {Ft}0≤t≤T as the
natural filtration generated by the Nn2-dimensional Brownian motion (W1(t), . . . ,WN (t)), and F =
FT . The admissible control set U of Ai is
U := {ui(·) : ui ∈ L2F (0, T ;Rn1)} .
Denote u = (u1, . . . , uN ) and u−i = (u1, . . . , ui−1, ui+1, . . . , uN ).
The function f ∈ L2(0, T ;Rn) is an unknown disturbance to characterize the model uncertainty,
and represents an influence from the common environment for decision-making. A natural motivation
for considering deterministic disturbance is the following. Although each player Ai regards the dis-
turbance as adversarial, it should not be excessively pessimistic by assuming that the latter will use
the sample path information of Wi to play against it, and instead only considers a deterministic f .
The cost functional of Ai is
Ji(ui, u−i, f) = E
[∫ T
0
(
|xi − (Γx(N) + η)|2Q + uTi Rui −
1
γ
|f(t)|2
)
dt+ xTi (T )Hxi(T )
]
, (4)
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where the symmetric matrices Q ≥ 0, R > 0, H ≥ 0 and the constant γ > 0. We assume uniform
agents in the sense that they share the same parameter datum (A,B,G,D; Γ, η,Q,R, γ,H). Also, to
simplify the analysis, we consider constant parameters.
Due to the unknown function f , Ai cannot evaluate its cost even if all control policies (u1, . . . , uN )
are known. To address this indeterminacy, we approach the game from a robust optimization point
of view where each agent takes f as an adversarial player. Here a soft-constraint [5, 49, 19] for the
disturbance is adopted in that the term − 1γ |f(t)|2 is included in (4) while f attempts to maximize.
For given (ui, u−i), define the worst case cost of Ai as
Jwoi (ui, u−i) = sup
f∈L2(0,T ;Rn)
Ji(ui, u−i, f).
A set of strategies (uˆ1, . . . , uˆN ) is a robust ε-Nash equilibrium for the N players if for ε ≥ 0,
Jwoi (uˆi, uˆ−i)− ε ≤ inf
ui∈U
Jwoi (ui, uˆ−i) ≤ Jwoi (uˆi, uˆ−i). (5)
Our central objective is to design decentralized strategies based on the above solution notion.
3 The Limiting Robust Optimization Problem
We start by making an appropriate approximation of the coupling term x(N). Adding up the N
equations in (3) and normalizing by 1/N , we obtain
dx(N) = [(A+G)x(N) +Bu(N) + f ]dt+D(1/N)
N∑
j=1
dWj ,
where u(N) = (1/N)
∑N
j=1 uj . Intuitively, from the point of view of Ai, u(N) may be approximated by
a deterministic function u¯. Moreover, when N →∞, (1/N)∑Nj=1 dWj vanishes due to the law of large
numbers. In turn, a deterministic function m can be used to approximate x(N). The above reasoning
suggests to introduce the limiting ordinary differential equation (ODE)
m˙ = (A+G)m+Bu¯+ f, m(0) = m0. (6)
3.1 The limiting model of the mean field game
Consider the optimization problem of a representative agent Ai:{
dxi = (Axi +Bui +Gmi + f)dt+DdWi,
m˙i = (A+G)mi +Bu¯+ f,
(7)
where the second equation is motivated from (6) and mi(0) = m0. For the limiting model (7),
(Wi, xi(0)) is the same as in (3). We reuse (xi,Ai) to denote the state and the corresponding agent.
This shall cause no risk of confusion. Since f will be determined as its worst case form depending on
xi(0), mi is associated with the agent index i so that it is ready as an appropriate notation for the
subsequent closed-loop dynamics. The cost functional is given by
J¯i(ui, f) = E
∫ T
0
{
|xi − (Γmi + η)|2Q + uTi Rui −
1
γ
|f(t)|2
}
dt+ ExTi (T )Hxi(T ).
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We aim to find a solution pair (fˆ , uˆi) such that
J¯i(uˆi, fˆ) = min
ui∈U
max
f∈L2(0,T ;Rn)
J¯i(ui, f). (8)
Finally, we need a consistency condition, i.e., 1N
∑N
i=1 uˆi converges to u¯ in some sense (this will be
made precise in Section 4) and we look for u¯ ∈ C([0, T ];Rn1); the feasibility of doing so will be clear
from our solution procedure. The next part of our plan is to show that such strategies have the
property in (5) when applied in the game of N agents. In the following, we solve the optimization
problem (8) in two steps.
3.2 The control problem with respect to the disturbance
Let ui ∈ U and u¯ ∈ C([0, T ];Rn1) be fixed. The optimal control problem is
(P1) maximizef∈L2(0,T ;Rn)J¯i(ui, f). (9)
Clearly ( P1) is equivalent to the following problem
(P1a) minimizef∈L2(0,T ;Rn)J¯
′
i(ui, f) = E
∫ T
0
{
−|xi − (Γmi + η)|2Q +
1
γ
|f(t)|2
}
dt
− ExTi (T )Hxi(T ).
(P1a) is an optimal control problem with negative semi-definite state weights. We are interested
in the situation where (P1a) is a strictly convex problem with a coercivity property. This ensures that
the worse case disturbance is uniquely determined by Ai. The procedure below to identify conditions
for ensuring convexity is similar to [37].
To study the convexity of J¯ ′i in f , we construct a simpler auxiliary optimal control problem. Denote
Q̂ = (I − Γ)TQ(I − Γ).
Consider the dynamics
z˙ = (A+G)z + g, z(0) = 0, (10)
where g ∈ L2(0, T ;Rn). The optimal control problem is
(P1b) minimize J¯ ′′i (g) =
∫ T
0
{
−zT Q̂z + 1
γ
|g(t)|2
}
dt− zT (T )Hz(T ).
For any s ∈ R, we have J¯ ′′i (sg) = s2J¯ ′′i (g), and so view J¯ ′′i as a quadratic functional of g.
Definition 1 Let F (g) be a real-valued functional of g ∈ L2(0, T ;Rn). If F (g) ≥ 0 for all g, F is said
to be positive semi-definite. If furthermore, F (g) > 0 for all g 6= 0, F is said to be positive definite.
Lemma 2 J¯ ′i(ui, f) is convex (resp., strictly convex) in f if and only if J¯
′′
i (g) is positive semi-definite
(resp., positive definite).
Proof. Let (xi,mi) and (x
′
i,m
′
i) be the state processes of (7) corresponding to (ui, f) and (ui, f
′),
respectively. Take any λ1 ∈ [0, 1] and denote λ2 = 1− λ1. Then
λ1J¯
′
i(ui, f) + λ2J¯
′
i(ui, f
′)− J¯ ′i(ui, λ1f + λ2f ′)
= λ1λ2E
∫ T
0
{
|xi − x′i − Γ(mi −m′i)|2Q +
1
γ
|f(t)− f ′(t)|2
}
dt− λ1λ2E|xi(T )− x′i(T )|2H .
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Denote g = f − f ′, and z = xi − x′i. Therefore, z is deterministic and satisfies (10). In addition,
mi −m′i = z for t ∈ [0, T ]. Hence
λ1J¯
′
i(ui, f) + λ2J¯
′
i(ui, f
′)− J¯ ′i(ui, λ1f + λ2f ′) = λ1λ2J¯ ′′i (g)
and the lemma follows. 
For our further existence analysis, we need to ensure J¯ ′i(ui, f) to be both strictly convex and
coercive in f . For this purpose, we introduce the following assumption.
(H1) There exists a small ǫ0 > 0 such that J¯
′′
i (g) − ǫ0‖g‖2L2 is positive semi-definite.
Note that (H1) is completely determined by the parameters (Q̂, γ, ǫ0,H, T ), and does not depend
on ui. Concerning (H1), we have the following result.
Proposition 3 The following statements are equivalent:
(i) (H1) holds true on [0, T ].
(ii) The Riccati equation
P˙ + (A+G)TP + P (A+G)− γP 2 − Q̂ = 0, P (T ) = −H (11)
has a unique solution on [0, T ].
(iii) For any t ∈ [0, T ],
det{[(0, I)eAt(0, I)T ]} > 0,
where A =
(
A+G+ γH −γI
Q˘ −(A+G+ γH)T
)
and Q˘ = γH2 + Q̂+ (A+G)TH +H(A+G).
Proof. In fact, (H1) is the uniform convexity condition proposed in [45], and the equivalence
between (i) and (ii) is a corollary of Theorem 4.6 of [45]. Moreover, (iii) =⇒ (ii) is given in Theorem
4.3 of [40]. On the other hand, (ii) =⇒ (iii) is implied by Theorems 2.7 and 2.9 of [54]. 
For illustration of condition (ii), we give the following example.
Example 4 Consider system (3)-(4) with parameters A = 0.5, B = 1, G = 0.25, Q = 1, Γ = 0.8,
R = 1.5, H = 0, γ = 1. Denote Â = A+G. We solve (11) to obtain
P (t) =
−Q̂(eα(t−T ) − e−α(t−T ))
λ2eα(t−T ) − λ1e−α(t−T )
, (12)
where
λ1 = −Â+
√
Â2 − γQ̂ = −0.027158, λ2 = −Â−
√
Â2 − γQ̂ = −1.472842,
α =
√
Â2 − γQ̂ = 0.722842.
If 0 < T < Tmax =
1
2α log(λ2/λ1) = 2.752198, P (t) given by (12) is well defined on [0, T ]. By the local
Lipschitz continuity property of the vector field in (11), P (t) is the unique solution.
Note that (11) is not a standard Riccati equation since the state weight matrix −Q̂ is not positive semi-
definite. In general, the solvability of (11) cannot be ensured on an arbitrary time horizon. Condition
(iii) enables us to determine the solvability of (11) on a given time horizon. Note that condition (iii) is
equivalent to det{[(0, I)eAt(0, I)T ]} 6= 0,∀t ∈ [0, T ] by noting det{[(0, I)eAt(0, I)T ]}t=0 = 1. Condition
(iii) is more checkable as illustrated by the following example.
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Example 5 Consider system (3)-(4) with parameters A = −0.5, G = 0.25, Q = 1, Γ = 0.8, H = 0,
γ = 1. We obtain A =
( −0.25 −1
0.04 0.25
)
, eAt =
(
−13e
3
20
t + 43e
− 3
20
t −103 e
3
20
t + 103 e
− 3
20
t
2
15e
3
20
t − 215e−
3
20
t 4
3e
3
20
t + 13e
− 3
20
t
)
, and
det{[(0, 1)eAt(0, 1)T ]} = 4
3
e
3
20
t +
1
3
e−
3
20
t > 0, ∀t ≥ 0. (13)
Thus for any T > 0, (11) admits a unique solution on [0, T ]. Therefore, (H1) holds true on [0, T ].
Lemma 6 Assume (H1). Then J¯ ′i(ui, f) is strictly convex in f . Moreover, J¯
′
i(ui, f) is coercive in f
and, in particular, there exists a constant Cui,xi(0) depending on (ui, xi(0)) such that
J¯ ′i(ui, f) ≥
ǫ0
2
‖f‖2L2 − Cui,xi(0).
Proof. Since J¯ ′′i (g)−ǫ0‖g‖2L2 is positive semi-definite by (H1), J¯ ′′i (g) is positive definite. By Lemma
2, J¯ ′i(ui, f) is strictly convex in f . Following the method in proving Lemma 2, we can further show
that χ(f) := J¯ ′i(ui, f)− ǫ0‖f‖2L2 is convex in f . By (7) and direct estimates, we can show
sup
‖f‖
L2≤1
|χ(f)| ≤ C0,ui,xi(0),
where the constant C0,ui,xi(0) depends on (ui, xi(0)). Now consider f with ‖f‖L2 ≥ 1. Define f1 =
f
‖f‖
L2
. The convexity of χ(f) implies
χ(f1) ≤ 1‖f‖L2
χ(f) +
‖f‖L2 − 1
‖f‖L2
χ(0) ≤ 1‖f‖L2
χ(f) + C0,ui,xi(0). (14)
Consequently, for ‖f‖L2 ≥ 1, (14) gives
χ(f) ≥ −2C0,uixi(0)‖f‖L2 .
Hence for any f , χ(f) ≥ −C0,ui,xi(0)(2‖f‖L2 + 1). It follows that
J¯ ′i(ui, f) = χ(f) + ǫ0‖f‖2L2
≥ ǫ0‖f‖2L2 − C0,ui,xi(0)(2‖f‖L2 + 1)
≥ ǫ0
2
‖f‖2L2 − Cui,xi(0)
for some constant Cui,xi(0). 
Theorem 7 Suppose that (H1) holds and let ui ∈ U and u¯ be fixed. Then
(i) J¯ ′i(ui, f) has a unique minimizer fˆ , or equivalently, J¯i(ui, f) has a unique maximizer fˆ ;
(ii) there exists a unique solution (xi,mi, pi) ∈ L2F (0, T ;Rn)×L2(0, T ;R2n) to the equation system
dxi = (Axi +Bui +Gmi + γpi)dt+DdWi,
m˙i = (A+G)mi +Bu¯+ γpi,
p˙i = −(A+G)T pi − (I − Γ)TQ[Exi − (Γmi + η)],
(15)
where mi(0) = m0 and pi(T ) = HExi(T ), and furthermore fˆ = γpi.
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Proof. (i) By Lemma 2, J¯ ′i is strictly convex and coercive. In addition, J¯
′
i is continuous in f . Hence
there exists a unique fˆ such that J¯ ′i(ui, fˆ) = inff J¯
′
i(ui, f) [33, Chap. 7], [39].
(ii) We start by establishing existence. Let the optimal state-control pair be denoted by (xi,mi, fˆ),
which is uniquely determined. We have the relation
dxi = (Axi +Bui +Gmi + γfˆ)dt+DdWi, (16)
m˙i = (A+G)mi +Bu¯+ γfˆ , (17)
where mi(0) = m0. By using (xi,mi), we obtain a unique solution pi from
p˙i = −(A+G)T pi − (I − Γ)TQ[Exi − (Γmi + η)], (18)
where pi(T ) = HExi(T ).
Now we consider another control f = fˆ + f˜ ∈ L2(0, T ;Rn) in place of fˆ . Let x˜i and m˜i be the first
variations of xi and mi, respectively, which result from the variation f˜ for fˆ . Then we have x˜i = m˜i
for all t ∈ [0, T ] and
dx˜i
dt
= (A+G)x˜i + f˜ , x˜i(0) = 0.
Since J¯ ′i has a minimum at (xi,mi, fˆ), the first variation of the cost satisfies
0 =
δJ¯ ′i
2
= E
∫ T
0
{
−[xi − (Γmi + η)]TQ(I − Γ)x˜i + 1
γ
fˆT f˜
}
dt− ExTi (T )Hx˜i(T ). (19)
On the other hand,
d
dt
(pTi x˜i) = x˜
T
i p˙i + p
T
i
dx˜i
dt
= −[Exi − (Γmi + η)]TQ(I − Γ)x˜i + pTi f˜ . (20)
Integrating both sides of (20) and invoking (19), we obtain
pTi (T )x˜i(T ) =
∫ T
0
(
pTi f˜ −
1
γ
fˆT f˜
)
dt+ ExTi (T )Hx˜i(T ). (21)
Recalling pi(T ) = HExi(T ), since f˜ is arbitrary, it follows from (21) that
fˆ = γpi
for a.e. t ∈ [0, T ]. Therefore, (xi,mi, pi) determined by (16)-(18) is a solution to (15).
We proceed to show uniqueness. Suppose that (x′i,m
′
i, p
′
i) is another solution of (15). Set the
control f ′ = γp′i. It is straightforward to show that the first variation of J¯
′
i at the state control pair
(x′i,m
′
i, f
′) is zero. Since J¯ ′i is strictly convex, this implies that (x
′
i,m
′
i, f
′) is the unique optimal state-
control pair and so coincides with (xi,mi, fˆ) where (xi,mi) is the optimal state process determined
from (16)-(18). This further implies p′i = pi. So uniqueness follows. The last part of (ii) is now
obvious. 
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3.3 The control problem of player Ai
Assume that (H1) holds. This will ensure that all the equation systems in this section have a well
defined solution. The dynamics are given by
dxi = (Axi +Bui +Gmi + γpi)dt+DdWi,
m˙i = (A+G)mi +Bu¯+ γpi,
p˙i = −(A+G)T pi − (I − Γ)TQ[Exi − (Γmi + η)],
(22)
where mi(0) = m0 and pi(T ) = HExi(T ). The optimal control problem is
(P2) minimizeui∈L2F (0,T ;Rn1)
J¯i(ui, fˆui) = E
∫ T
0
{|xi − (Γmi + η)|2Q + uTi Rui − γ|pi(t)|2} dt
+ ExTi (T )Hxi(T ).
Here we have taken fˆui = γpi which depends on ui. We may simply write J¯i(ui). This is again a linear
quadratic optimal control problem with indefinite weight for the state vector (xi,mi, pi). Note that a
perturbation in ui will cause a change of the mean term Exi. So this is essentially a mean field type
optimal control problem; see related work [3, 53].
We continue to identify conditions under which (P2) is strictly convex and coercive. These condi-
tions will be characterized by using an auxiliary control problem with dynamics
z˙i = Azi +Bνi +Gz + γq,
z˙ = (A+G)z + γq,
q˙ = −(A+G)T q − (I − Γ)TQ(zi − Γz),
(23)
where zi(0) = z(0) = 0 and q(T ) = Hzi(T ). The control νi ∈ L2(0, T ;Rn1). The optimal control
problem is
(P2a) minimize J¯ai (νi) =
∫ T
0
{|zi − Γz|2Q + νTi Rνi − γ|q(t)|2} dt+ |zi(T )|2H . (24)
We may view this as a deterministic optimal control problem with two point boundary value conditions
for the state trajectory. We say J¯ai is positive semi-definite if J¯
a
i (νi) ≥ 0 for all νi; if furthermore,
J¯ai (νi) > 0 whenever νi 6= 0, we say J¯ai is positive definite. In order to have a well defined optimal
control problem, we need to show that (23) has a unique solution.
Lemma 8 Assume (H1). For each νi, there exists a unique solution (zi, z, q) ∈ C1([0, T ];R3n) to
(23).
Proof. Indeed, by taking ui = 0 and ui = νi ∈ L2(0, T ;Rn1) in (22), we obtain two solutions
(x0i ,m
0
i , p
0
i ) and (x
νi
i ,m
νi
i , p
νi
i ), respectively. It is easy to show that (zi, z, q) := (x
νi
i − x0i ,mνii −
m0i , p
νi
i − p0i ) is a solution of (23) by observing that xνii − x0i is deterministic.
If there exist two different solutions to (23) for some νi, then we can construct two different
solutions to (22) for a given ui, which is a contradiction to Theorem 7. 
Lemma 9 J¯i(ui) is convex (resp., strictly convex) in ui ∈ U if and only if J¯ai (νi) is positive semi-
definite (resp., positive definite).
Proof. See appendix A. 
We introduce the following assumption.
(H2) There exists a small constant δ0 > 0 such that J¯
a
i (νi)− δ0‖νi‖2 ≥ 0 for all νi ∈ L2(0, T ;Rn1).
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3.4 Representation of the quadratic functional
We intend to find an expression of J¯ai (νi) so that (H2) can be characterized in a more explicit form.
A change of coordinates will make the computation more convenient. Define zˇ = zi − z. Then (23)
becomes 
˙ˇz = Azˇ +Bνi,
z˙ = (A+G)z + γq,
q˙ = −Q̂z − (A+G)T q − (I − Γ)TQzˇ,
(25)
where zˇ(0) = z(0) = 0 and q(T ) = H(zˇ(T ) + z(T )).
Define the Hamiltonian matrix
H =
[
A+G γI
−Q̂ −(A+G)T
]
and the matrix ODE Φ˙(t) = HΦ(t) where Φ(0) = I. Denote the partition
Φ(t) =
[
Φ11(t) Φ12(t)
Φ21(t) Φ22(t)
]
,
where each submatrix Φij is an n× n matrix function.
We have
zˇ(t) =
∫ t
0
eA(t−τ)Bνi(τ)dτ. (26)
By solving (z, q) in (25), we obtain
z(t) = Φ12(t)q(0) −
∫ t
0
Φ12(t− s)(I − Γ)TQzˇ(s)ds,
q(t) = Φ22(t)q(0) −
∫ t
0
Φ22(t− s)(I − Γ)TQzˇ(s)ds,
where q(0) is to be determined. At the terminal time,
z(T ) = Φ12(T )q(0) −
∫ T
0
Φ12(T − s)(I − Γ)TQzˇ(s)ds
and
q(T ) = Φ22(T )q(0) −
∫ T
0
Φ22(T − s)(I − Γ)TQzˇ(s)ds
= Hzˇ(T ) +HΦ12(T )q(0)−H
∫ T
0
Φ12(T − s)(I − Γ)TQzˇ(s)ds,
where the second equality is due to the terminal condition of q. It follows that
[Φ22(T )−HΦ12(T )]q(0) = Hzˇ(T ) +
∫ T
0
[Φ22(T − s)−HΦ12(T − s)](I − Γ)TQzˇ(s)ds. (27)
Proposition 10 If (H1) holds, Φ22(T )−HΦ12(T ) is nonsingular.
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Proof. Under (H1), (25) has a unique solution by Lemma 8, and accordingly, q(0) is uniquely
determined. If Φ22(T ) − HΦ12(T ) is singular, we may find two different solutions of q(0) from (27)
which further give two different solutions to (25), leading to a contradiction. Hence, Φ22 −HΦ12(T )
is nonsingular. 
By solving q(0) in (27) and further eliminating zˇ, we write z and q as integrals depending on νi.
Define the linear operator
[L(νi)](t) =
 zˇ(t)z(t)
q(t)
 .
By standard estimates we can show that L is a linear and bounded operator from L2(0, T ;Rn1) to
L2(0, T ;R3n). Let L∗ be its adjoint operator from L2(0, T ;R3n) to L2(0, T ;Rn1). Define the operator
LT νi = zˇ(T ) + z(T ).
It can be shown that LT is a linear and bounded operator from L2(0, T ;Rn1) to Rn. Let L∗T be its
adjoint operator. Now J¯ai may be represented in terms of the inner product on L
2(0, T ;Rn1):
J¯ai (νi) = 〈Θνi, νi〉+ 〈Rνi, νi〉+ 〈ΘT νi, νi〉, (28)
where
Θνi = L∗
 Q Q(I − Γ) 0(I − Γ)TQ Q̂ 0
0 0 −γI
Lνi, ΘT νi = L∗THLT νi.
Proposition 11
(i) J¯i(ui) is convex in ui ∈ U if and only if 〈(Θ + ΘT +R)νi, νi〉 ≥ 0 for all νi ∈ L2(0, T ;Rn1).
(ii) (H2) holds if and only if there exists δ0 > 0 such that 〈(Θ + ΘT + R)νi, νi〉 ≥ δ0‖νi‖2L2 for all
νi ∈ L2(0, T ;Rn1).
Proof. (i) follows from Lemma 9 and the representation (28). (ii) follows from (28). 
The criterion in part (ii) of Proposition 11 still involves the operators Θ and ΘT on an infinite
dimensional space. Here we give a sufficient condition to endure (H2) based on some more computable
parameters. It is clear that 〈(Θ + ΘT + R)νi, νi〉 ≥
∫ T
0 (|νi(t)|2R − γ|q(t)|2)dt. For simplicity, we only
consider the case H = 0, and simple computations lead to
q(t) = Φ22(t)Φ
−1
22 (T )
∫ T
0
Φ22(T − s)(I − Γ)TQ
∫ s
0
eA(s−τ)Bνi(τ)dτds
−
∫ t
0
Φ22(t− s)(I − Γ)TQ
∫ s
0
eA(s−τ)Bνi(τ)dτds =: q1(t)− q2(t).
Denote b1 = sup0≤t≤T |Φ22(t)|, b2 = sup0≤t≤T |Φ22(t)Φ−122 (T )|, b3 = |Q(I − Γ)|, b4 =
∫ T
0 |eAsB|ds
and b5 = sup0≤t≤T |eAtB|. By exchanging the order of integration in q1 and q2, it is easy to show
|q1(t)|2 ≤ (b1b2b3b4)2T
∫ T
0
ν2i (s)ds, |q2(t)| ≤ b1b3b5
∫ t
0
(t− τ)|νi(τ)|dτ,
which further gives ∫ T
0
|q(t)|2dt ≤ Cq
∫ T
0
|νi(t)|2dt, (29)
where Cq = 2(b1b2b3b4)
2T 2 + 16 (b1b3b5)
2T 4. For the case H = 0, (H2) holds whenever R > γCqI.
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3.5 The solution of (P2)
Let u¯ ∈ C([0, T ];Rn1) be fixed.
Lemma 12 Assume (H1)-(H2). Then (P2) has a unique optimal state-control pair of the form
(xi,mi, pi, uˆi) satisfying
dxi = (Axi +Buˆi +Gmi + γpi)dt+DdWi,
m˙i = (A+G)mi +Bu¯+ γpi,
p˙i = −(A+G)T pi − (I − Γ)TQ[Exi − (Γmi + η)],
(30)
where pi(T ) = HExi(T ). Furthermore, the backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE){
dyi =
{−AT yi +Q[xi − (Γmi + η)]} dt+ ζidWi,
yi(T ) = −Hxi(T )
(31)
has a unique solution (yi, ζi) ∈ L2F (0, T ;R2n) and
uˆi = R
−1BTyi. (32)
Proof. Under (H2), by adapting Lemma 9 to the auxiliary control problem with cost functional
J¯i(ui) − δ0E
∫ T
0 |ui|2dt, we can show that J¯i(ui) − δ0E
∫ T
0 |ui|2dt is convex in ui. By the method in
proving Lemma 6, we can further show that J¯i is strictly convex and coercive in ui. Hence (P2) has
a unique optimal state-control pair (xi,mi, pi, uˆi) which minimizes J¯i(ui).
Given (xi,mi, pi, uˆi), (31) is a standard linear BSDE and so has a unique solution (yi, ζi). Further
define the BSDE
dy =
{−GT yi − (A+G)T y − ΓTQ[xi − (Γmi + η)]} dt+ ζdWi,
where y(T ) = 0. It also has a unique solution (y, ζ) ∈ L2F (0, T ;R2n). It can be checked that
d
dt
[E(y + yi) + pi] = −(A+G)T [E(y + yi) + pi]
and E(y(T ) + yi(T )) + pi(T ) = 0. So
E(yi + y) + pi = 0 (33)
for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Let uˆi be replaced by uˆi + u˜i ∈ L2F (0, T ;Rn1) in (30), and the resulting solution be denoted by
(xi + x˜i,mi + m˜i, pi + p˜i), which exists and is unique by Theorem 7. It follows that
˙˜xi = Ax˜i +Bu˜i +Gm˜i + γp˜i,
˙˜mi = (A+G)m˜i + γp˜i,
˙˜pi = −(A+G)T p˜i − (I − Γ)TQ(Ex˜i − Γm˜i),
where x˜i(0) = m˜i(0) = 0 and p˜i(T ) = HEx˜i(T ). The first variation of J¯i about uˆi satisfies
0 =
δJ¯i
2
= E
∫ T
0
{
(x˜i − Γm˜i)TQ[xi − (Γmi + η)] + u˜Ti Ruˆi − γp˜Ti pi
}
dt+ Ex˜Ti (T )Hxi(T ). (34)
By applying Ito’s formula to x˜Ti yi, we obtain
Ex˜Ti (T )yi(T )− Ex˜Ti (0)yi(0) = E
∫ T
0
{
x˜Ti Q[xi − (Γmi + η)] + yTi (Bu˜i +Gm˜i + γp˜i)
}
dt.
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Similarly,
Em˜Ti (T )y(T )− Em˜Ti (0)y(0) = E
∫ T
0
{
γyT p˜i − m˜Ti (GT yi + ΓTQ[xi − (Γmi + η)])
}
dt.
Therefore, adding up the two equations yields
− Ex˜Ti (T )Hxi(T ) = E
∫ T
0
{
(x˜i − Γm˜i)TQ[xi − (Γmi + η)] + yTi Bu˜i + γ(y + yi)T p˜i
}
dt. (35)
By (34) and (35),
E
∫ T
0
[u˜Ti Ruˆi − γp˜Ti pi − u˜Ti BTyi − γp˜Ti (y + yi)]dt = 0.
Note that by (33),
E
∫ T
0
p˜Ti (pi + y + yi)dt =
∫ T
0
p˜Ti [pi + E(y + yi)]dt = 0.
Hence,
E
∫ T
0
u˜Ti (Ruˆi −BT yi)dt = 0.
Since u˜i ∈ L2F (0, T ;Rn1) is arbitrary, (32) follows. 
After substituting uˆi = R
−1BTyi into (30), we form the equation system
dxi = (Axi +BR
−1BT yi +Gmi + γpi)dt+DdWi,
m˙i = (A+G)mi +Bu¯+ γpi,
p˙i = −(A+G)T pi − (I − Γ)TQ[Exi − (Γmi + η)],
dyi =
{−AT yi +Q[xi − (Γmi + η)]} dt+ ζidWi,
(36)
where xi(0) is given, mi(0) = m0, pi(T ) = HExi(T ), and yi(T ) = −Hxi(T ). This equation system
consists of 2 forward equations and 2 backward equations. It is clear that the solution of the optimal
control problem (P2) satisfies the above FBSDE. A natural question is whether this FBSDE’s solution
completely determines the optimal control. This is answered by the next theorem. Denote
S[0, T ] = L2F (0, T ;R
n)× C1([0, T ];R2n)× L2F (0, T ;R2n).
Theorem 13 Assume (H1)-(H2). Then the FBSDE (36) has a unique solution (xi,mi, pi, yi, ζi) ∈
S[0, T ] and the optimal control for (P2) is given by uˆi = R
−1BT yi.
Proof. We solve (P1) first and (P2) next to determine uˆi. By Lemma 12, we obtain (xi,mi, pi, yi, ζi)
to satisfy (30)-(31) and uˆi = R
−1BTyi. Obviously, (xi,mi, pi, yi, ζi) satisfies (36).
We continue to show uniqueness. Suppose that (xi,mi, pi, yi, ζi) and (x
′
i,m
′
i, p
′
i, y
′
i, ζ
′
i) are two
solutions of (36). Define uˇi = R
−1BTyi and u
′
i = R
−1BTy′i which are both well-determined elements
in L2F (0, T ;R
n1). In particular, we have
dxi = (Axi +Buˇi +Gmi + γpi)dt+DdWi,
m˙i = (A+G)mi +Bu¯+ γpi,
p˙i = −(A+G)T pi − (I − Γ)TQ[Exi − (Γmi + η)],
dyi =
{−AT yi +Q[xi − (Γmi + η)]} dt+ ζidWi,
(37)
where xi(0) is given, mi(0) = m0, pi(T ) = HExi(T ), and yi(T ) = −Hxi(T ).
As in the proof of Lemma 12, we evaluate the first variation of J¯i(ui) at (xi,mi, pi, uˇi) and can
show δJ¯i = 0. Since J¯i is convex, this zero first variation condition implies that uˇi is an optimal control
of (P2). By the same reasoning, u′i is also an optimal control. By strict convexity, we have uˇi = u
′
i.
Subsequently, we have (xi,mi, pi) = (x
′
i,m
′
i, p
′
i) by Theorem 7. This further implies (yi, ζi) = (y
′
i, ζ
′
i). 
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4 The Solution of the Robust Game
Note that Theorem 13 determines the strategy of a representative agent when u¯ is fixed. Denote
x(N) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
xi, y
(N) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
yi, m
(N) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
mi, p
(N) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
pi. (38)
By (36), we obtain
dx(N) =
(
Ax(N) +BR−1BT y(N) +Gm(N) + γp(N)
)
dt+ DN
∑N
i=1 dWi,
dm(N)
dt = (A+G)m
(N) +Bu¯+ γp(N),
dp(N)
dt = −(A+G)T p(N) − (I − Γ)TQ
[
Ex(N) − (Γm(N) + η)] ,
dy(N) =
{−AT y(N) +Q[x(N) − (Γm(N) + η)]} dt+ 1N ∑Ni=1 ζidWi,
(39)
where x(N)(0) = (1/N)
∑N
i=1 xi(0),m
(N)(0) = m0, p
(N)(T ) = HEx(N)(T ), and y(N)(T ) = −Hx(N)(T ).
As an approximation to (39), we construct the following limiting system
x˙ = Ax+BR−1BTy+Gm+ γp,
m˙ = (A+G)m+Bu¯+ γp,
p˙ = −(A+G)Tp− (I − Γ)TQ[x− (Γm+ η)],
y˙ = −ATy +Q[x− (Γm+ η)],
(40)
where x(0) =m(0) = m0, p(T ) = Hx(T ), and y(T ) = −Hx(T ). This is a two point boundary value
problem.
Note that y is intended as an approximation of y(N) when N →∞. The consistency requirement
imposes
u¯ = R−1BTy. (41)
Under the condition (41), the first two equations in (40) coincide to give x = m for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Consequently, we eliminate the equation of x and introduce the new system
m˙ = (A+G)m+BR−1BTy + γp,
p˙ = −(A+G)Tp− (I − Γ)TQ[m− (Γm+ η)],
y˙ = −ATy +Q[m− (Γm+ η)],
(42)
where m(0) = m0, p(T ) = Hm(T ), and y(T ) = −Hm(T ). This is still a two point boundary value
problem. The next corollary follows from Theorem 13.
Corollary 14 Assume (H1)-(H2). Suppose that (42) has a unique solution (m,p,y) ∈ C1([0, T ];R3n)
and take u¯ = R−1BTy in (36). Then (36) has a unique solution (xi,mi, pi, yi, ζi) ∈ S[0, T ]. 
4.1 The special case of same initial conditions
Consider the special case where all agents have the same initial condition xi(0) = m0 for all i ≥ 1.
The FBSDE (36) defines a mapping
Λ(u¯) = R−1BTEyi,
where we take u¯ ∈ C([0, T ];Rn1). Clearly R−1BTEyi is a continuous Rn1-valued function of t ∈ [0, T ].
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By the consistency requirement u¯ = Λ(u¯), we set u¯ = R−1BTEyi in the second equation of (36)
to obtain the equation system of the mean field game:
dxi = (Axi +BR
−1BT yi +Gmi + γpi)dt+DdWi,
m˙i = (A+G)mi +BR
−1BTEyi + γpi,
p˙i = −(A+G)T pi − (I − Γ)TQ[Exi − (Γmi + η)],
dyi =
{−AT yi +Q[xi − (Γmi + η)]} dt+ ζidWi,
(43)
where xi(0) = mi(0) = m0, pi(T ) = HExi(T ), and yi(T ) = −Hxi(T ).
An interesting fact is that the existence and uniqueness of a solution to (43) is completely deter-
mined by the ODE system (42) without further using (H1)-(H2).
Theorem 15 (43) has a unique solution (xi,mi, pi, yi, ζi) ∈ S[0, T ] if and only if (42) has a unique
solution.
Proof. By Lemma B.1, (43) has a unique solution if and only if the FBSDE (B.1) has a unique
solution. By Lemma B.2 and Lemma B.3-(iii), the FBSDE (B.1) has a unique solution if and only if
(42) has a unique solution. The theorem follows. 
4.2 Existence of a solution to (42)
To study the existence and uniqueness of a solution to (42), we use a fixed point approach and introduce
the equation system 
m˙ = (A+G)m+ h+ γp,
p˙ = −(A+G)Tp− Q̂m+ (I − Γ)TQη,
y˙ = −ATy+Q[m− (Γm+ η)],
(44)
where h ∈ C([0, T ];Rn), m(0) = m0, p(T ) = Hm(T ), and y(T ) = −Hm(T ). The next lemma
identifies a sufficient condition for (44) to have a unique solution for any h ∈ C([0, T ];Rn).
Lemma 16 Suppose that the Riccati equation
K˙ +K(A+G) + (A+G)TK − γK2 − Q̂ = 0, K(T ) = −H (45)
has a unique solution on [0, T ]. Then (44) defines a mapping from C([0, T ];Rn) to itself:
Λ1 : h 7−→ BR−1BTy.
Proof. We write p = −Km+ φ for (44) and obtain the ODE
φ˙ = −(A+G− γK)φ+Kh+ (I − Γ)TQη, φ(T ) = 0.
It follows that
m˙ = (A+G− γK)m+ h+ γφ.
Let the fundamental solution matrices of the two ODEs
ϕ˙ = (A+G− γK)ϕ, ψ˙ = −(A+G− γK)Tψ
be Φ(t, s) and Ψ(t, s), respectively, with Φ(s, s) = Ψ(s, s) = I. Then Ψ(t, s) = ΦT (s, t). We obtain
φ(t) = −
∫ T
t
Ψ(t, s1)[K(s1)h(s1) + (I − Γ)TQη]ds1.
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This in turn gives
m(t) = Φ(t, 0)m0 +
∫ t
0
Φ(t, s1)h(s1)ds1
− γ
∫ t
0
Φ(t, s2)
∫ T
s2
Ψ(s2, s1)[K(s1)h(s1) + (I − Γ)TQη]ds1ds2.
We further solve
y(t) = −
∫ T
t
e−A
T (t−s3)Q[(I − Γ)m(s3)− η]ds3 − e−AT (t−T )Hm(T ),
which implies y ∈ C([0, T ];Rn). The lemma follows. 
To simplify the existence analysis for (42) in this section, we consider the case H = 0. Below
Υk denotes a continuous function of t which does not depend on h and can be easily determined.
Consequently,
y(t) = −
∫ T
t
e−A
T (t−s3)Q[(I − Γ)m(s3)− η]ds3
= −
∫ T
t
e−A
T (t−s3)Q(I − Γ)m(s3)ds3 +Υ1(t)
= −
∫ T
t
e−A
T (t−s2)Q(I − Γ)
∫ s2
0
Φ(s2, s1)h(s1)ds1ds2
+ γ
∫ T
t
e−A
T (t−s3)Q(I − Γ)
∫ s3
0
Φ(s3, s2)
∫ T
s2
Ψ(s2, s1)K(s1)h(s1)ds1ds2ds3
+Υ2(t).
Now we have
Λ1(h)(t) = BR
−1BTy(t)
=−BR−1BT
∫ T
t
e−A
T (t−s2)Q(I − Γ)
∫ s2
0
Φ(s2, s1)h(s1)ds1ds2
+ γBR−1BT
∫ T
t
e−A
T (t−s3)Q(I − Γ)
∫ s3
0
Φ(s3, s2)
∫ T
s2
Ψ(s2, s1)K(s1)h(s1)ds1ds2ds3
+BR−1BTΥ2(t)
=: Λ0(h)(t) +BR
−1BTΥ2(t).
It is clear that Λ0 is from C([0, T ];R
n) to itself. 
Define the constants
c1 = max
t∈[0,T ]
|K(t)|, c2 = max
0≤t,s≤T
|Φ(t, s)|,
c3 = max
t∈[0,T ]
∫ T
t
|eA(s−t)|sds, c4 = max
t∈[0,T ]
∫ T
t
|eA(s−t)|(Ts− s
2
2
)ds.
Note that Ts− s22 ≥ 0 for s ∈ [0, T ]. Denote |h| = maxt∈[0,T ] |h(t)|.
Theorem 17 Assume H = 0. If
c2|BR−1BT | · |Q(I − Γ)| (c3 + γc1c2c4) < 1, (46)
then (42) has a unique solution.
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Proof. For each t,
|Λ0(h)(t)| ≤ c2|h| · |BR−1BT | · |Q(I − Γ)|
∫ T
t
|eAT (s2−t)|s2ds2
+ γc1c
2
2|h| · |BR−1BT | · |Q(I − Γ)|
∫ T
t
|eAT (s3−t)|
∫ s3
0
∫ T
s2
ds1ds2ds3
= c2|h| · |BR−1BT | · |Q(I − Γ)|
∫ T
t
|eA(s2−t)|s2ds2
+ γc1c
2
2|h| · |BR−1BT | · |Q(I − Γ)|
∫ T
t
|eA(s3−t)|(Ts3 − s
2
3
2
)ds3
= c2|BR−1BT | · |Q(I − Γ)| (c3 + γc1c2c4) .
Hence, Λ1 is a contraction and has a unique fixed point. So (42) has a unique solution. 
The constants c1, . . . , c4 in (46) do not depend on BR
−1BT . If BR−1BT is suitably small, (46)
can be ensured.
Example 18 Consider the system with parameters given by Example 4. Take T = 1.3. In analogue
to (12), we can solve K(t) on [0, T ] for (45). It can be shown that K(t) ≤ 0 for t ∈ [0, T ] and |K(t)|
attains its maximum on [0, T ] at t = 0. We have K(0) = −0.171417 which gives c1 = 0.171417. So
c2 ≤ e(A+G+|K(0)|)T = 3.312961. Furthermore,
c3 ≤
∫ T
0
eAssds = 1.318243, c4 ≤
∫ T
0
eAs(Ts− s
2
2
)ds = 1.112937.
Subsequently,
c2|BR−1BT | · |Q(I − Γ)| (c3 + γc1c2c4) ≤ 0.861493.
So (46) holds.
Remark 1 For the two-point boundary value problem, the contraction estimate in the fixed point
method may be conservative and typically works on small time intervals for the solvability of (42)
(see, e.g., Ch.1, Sec. 5, [40]).
We continue to derive another condition under which (42) is solvable without restriction to a small
time horizon. To this end, we first rewrite (42) in the following form:
 m˙p˙
y˙
 = A˜
 mp
y
+ η˜,
m(0) = m0, p(T ) = Hm(T ), y(T ) = −Hm(T ),
(47)
where
A˜ =
 A+G γ BR−1BT−(I − Γ)TQ(I − Γ) −(A+G)T 0
Q(1− Γ) 0 −AT
 , η˜ =
 0(I − Γ)TQη
−Qη
 .
Then, by the variation of constant formula, we have m(t)p(t)
y(t)
 = Θ(t)
 m0µ
ν
+Θ(t)∫ t
0
Θ−1(s)η˜ds, (48)
where Θ(t) = eA˜t and p, y have the initial conditions p(0) = µ, y(0) = ν. Noting the terminal condition
in (47), now we present the following result.
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Proposition 19 [40, Ch.2, Sec. 3] If for given T > 0, det(Θ˜(T )) 6= 0, where
Θ˜(T ) =
( −H I 0
H 0 I
)
Θ(T )
 0 0I 0
0 I
 ,
then (42) has a unique solution on [0, T ] for any initial value m0.
For illustration, we give the following example.
Example 20 Consider system (3)-(4) with all parameters being scalar-valued and Γ = 1, H = 0. We
calculate
A =
(
A+G −γ
0 −(A+G)
)
, A˜ =
 A+G γ R−1B20 −(A+G) 0
0 0 −A
 ,
where A is defined in Proposition 3. By direct computations, we obtain
det{[(0, I)eAt(0, I)T ]} = e−(A+G)t > 0
for all t ∈ [0, T ], which ensures (H1) by Proposition 3. Moreover, b3 = 0 gives Cq = 0 in (29) so that
(H2) always holds true for R > 0. Finally, det(Θ˜(t)) = e−(2A+G)t > 0, and subsequently, (42) has a
unique solution on any interval [0, T ]. To summarize, (H1), (H2) and the solvability of (42) are all
satisfied by the system.
Note that the solvability of (42) in Example 20 does not depend on the value of R−1B2, which is
different from the condition in Theorem 17.
5 Error Estimate of the Mean Field Approximation
We suppose that (42) has a unique solution (m,p,y) and accordingly take u¯ in (36) as
u¯∗ = R−1BTy. (49)
The FBSDE system (36) now becomes
dxi = (Axi +BR
−1BT yi +Gmi + γpi)dt+DdWi,
m˙i = (A+G)mi +Bu¯
∗ + γpi,
p˙i = −(A+G)T pi − (I − Γ)TQ[Exi − (Γmi + η)],
dyi =
{−AT yi +Q[xi − (Γmi + η)]} dt+ ζidWi,
(50)
where xi(0) is given, mi(0) = m0, pi(T ) = HExi(T ), and yi(T ) = −Hxi(T ). By Corollary 14, this
FBSDE has a unique solution. In the game of N players, let yi be solved from (50) and denote the
control for Ai by
uˆi = R
−1Byi, 1 ≤ i ≤ N, (51)
which is a well defined process in L2F (0, T ;R
n1).
For uˆ(N) = (1/N)
∑N
i=1 uˆi, we aim to estimate
E|uˆ(N)(t)− u¯∗(t)|2.
Note that uˆ1, . . . , uˆN are independent, but they are not necessarily with the same distribution due to
possibly different initial states of the agents. This fact will somehow complicate our error estimate.
The key result of this section is the following theorem.
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Theorem 21 Assume that (H1)-(H2) hold and that (42) has a unique solution. We have
sup
0≤t≤T
E|uˆ(N) − u¯∗|2 = O(1/N) +O(|x(N)(0)−m0|2),
where x(N)(0) = (1/N)
∑N
i=1 xi(0). 
The proof of Theorem 21 is provided in the remaining part of this section. To do this, we need to
prove some lemmas under the assumption of the theorem. Recalling (38), we take u¯ = u¯∗ in (39) to
write 
dx(N) =
(
Ax(N) +BR−1BT y(N) +Gm(N) + γp(N)
)
dt+ DN
∑N
i=1 dWi,
dm(N)
dt = (A+G)m
(N) +Bu¯∗ + γp(N),
dp(N)
dt = −(A+G)T p(N) − (I − Γ)TQ
[
Ex(N) − (Γm(N) + η)] ,
dy(N) =
{−AT y(N) +Q[x(N) − (Γm(N) + η)]} dt+ 1N ∑Ni=1 ζidWi,
(52)
where x(N)(0) = (1/N)
∑N
i=1 xi(0),m
(N)(0) = m0, p
(N)(T ) = HEx(N)(T ), and y(N)(T ) = −Hx(N)(T ).
Denote the ODE system
x˙N = AxN +BR
−1BTyN +GmN + γpN ,
m˙N = (A+G)mN +Bu¯
∗ + γpN ,
p˙N = −(A+G)TpN − (I − Γ)TQ[xN − (ΓmN + η)],
y˙N = −ATyN +Q[xN − (ΓmN + η)],
(53)
where xN (0) = (1/N)
∑N
i=1 xi(0), mN (0) = m0, pN (T ) = HxN (T ), and yN (T ) = −HxN (T ). The
initial condition xN (0) is different from that of (40).
Lemma 22 (53) has a unique solution which can be denoted as
(xN ,mN ,pN ,yN ) = (Ex
(N),m(N), p(N),Ey(N)).
Proof. Existence follows by taking expectation in (52). To show uniqueness, suppose that (53) has
two different solutions (xN ,mN ,pN ,yN ) and (x
′
N ,m
′
N ,p
′
N ,y
′
N ). Then for any λ ∈ R,
(xi,mi, pi, yi, ζi) + λ(xN − x′N ,mN −m′N ,pN − p′N ,yN − y′N , 0)
satisfies (36), which is a contradiction to Theorem 13. Uniqueness follows. 
Lemma 23 We have
sup
0≤t≤T
(
E|x(N) − Ex(N)|2 + E|y(N) − Ey(N)|2
)
= O(1/N).
Proof. Define
(θ1, θ2) = (x
(N) − Ex(N), y(N) − Ey(N)).
By (52), (53) and Lemma 22,{
dθ1 = (Aθ1 +BR
−1BT θ2)dt+
D
N
∑N
i=1 dWi,
dθ2 = (−AT θ2 +Qθ1)dt+ 1N
∑N
i=1 ζidWi,
where θ1(0) = 0 and θ2(T ) = −Hθ1(T ).
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Let P be the solution of the Riccati equation
P˙ +ATP + PA− PBR−1BTP +Q = 0, P (T ) = H.
Denote θ2 = −Pθ1 + ψ, where ψ(T ) = 0. This gives the equation
dψ = −(A−BR−1BTP )Tψdt+ 1
N
N∑
i=1
(PD + ζi)dWi,
where ψ(T ) = 0. There is a unique solution ψ = 0 for t ∈ [0, T ]. This implies
dθ1 = (A−BR−1BTP )θ1dt+ D
N
N∑
i=1
dWi.
Hence, sup0≤t≤T E|θ1(t)|2 = O(1/N). The lemma follows since θ2 = −Pθ1. 
When (m,p,y) is a unique solution of (42), it can be shown that (x,m,y,p) := (m,m,y,p) is a
unique solution of (40) under the condition (41).
Lemma 24 We have
sup
0≤t≤T
[|xN − x|+ |mN −m|+ |pN − p|+ |yN − y|] = O(|x(N)(0)−m0|).
Proof. Consider 
h˙1 = Ah1 +BR
−1BTh4 +Gh2 + γh3,
h˙2 = (A+G)h2 + γh3,
h˙3 = −(A+G)Th3 − (I − Γ)TQ(h1 − Γh2),
h˙4 = −ATh4 +Q(h1 − Γh2),
(54)
where h1(0) is given, h2(0) = 0, h3(T ) = Hh1(T ), and h4(T ) = −Hh1(T ). It is constructed as a
homogeneous version of (53). We claim that (54) has a unique solution for any given value of h1(0).
If this were not true, there would exist h(0) such that (54) has multiple solutions which, in turn, can
be used to construct multiple solutions to (53). This would give a contradiction to Lemma 22.
It is clear that
(xN − x,mN −m,pN − p,yN − y) =: (h1, h2, h3, h4),
is a solution of (54) with h1(0) = xN (0)−m0.
Let e1, . . . en be a canonical basis of R
n. For h1(0) = ek, we obtain a solution of (54), denoted
by hk = (hk1 , h
k
2 , h
k
3 , h
k
4). Let (z)k be the kth component of a vector z. We may uniquely denote
(xN − x,mN −m,pN − p,yN − y) as a linear combination of h1, . . . , hn:
(xN − x,mN −m,pN − p,yN − y) =
n∑
k=1
(xN (0)−m0)k(hk1 , hk2 , hk3 , hk4).
The lemma follows readily. 
Proof of Theorem 21. For u¯ = u¯∗, we write uˆ(N) = R−1BT (1/N)
∑N
i=1 yi = R
−1BTy(N). We
have
|uˆ(N) − u¯∗|2 = E|R−1BT (y(N) − y)|2
≤ CE|y(N) − y|2
= CE|y(N) − Ey(N) + Ey(N) − y|2
≤ C(1/N) + C|yN − y|2
= O(1/N) +O(|x(N)(0)−m0|2).
The second inequality follows from Lemmas 22 and 23, and the last step follows from Lemma 24. 
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6 Robust Nash Equilibrium
Throughout this section, we assume that (42) has a unique solution and take u¯ = u¯∗ determined by
(49). For f ∈ L2(0, T ;Rn) and ui ∈ L2F (0, T ;Rn1), 1 ≤ i ≤ N , recall the worst case cost
Jwoi (ui, u−i) = sup
f∈L2(0,T ;Rn)
Ji(ui, u−i, f).
It is clear that for each i and any (ui, u−i), supf Ji(ui, u−i, f) ≥ 0.
Consider the set of strategies (uˆi, uˆ−i) given by (51) for a population ofN players with dynamics (3).
It should be emphasized that we only use (50)-(51) to make a well defined process uˆi in L
2
F (0, T ;R
n1)
which should not be understood as a feedback strategy. The main result of this section is the next
theorem which characterizes the performance of this set of strategies.
Theorem 25 Assume (i) (H1)-(H2) hold; (ii) supi≥0 |xi(0)| ≤ M0 where M0 does not depend on
N ; (iii) (42) has a unique solution. Then the set of strategies (uˆ1, . . . , uˆN ) given by (51) is a robust
εN -Nash equilibrium for the N players, i.e.,
Jwoi (uˆi, uˆ−i)− εN ≤ inf
ui∈U
Jwoi (ui, uˆ−i) ≤ Jwoi (uˆi, uˆ−i), (55)
where 0 ≤ εN = O(1/
√
N + |x(N)(0)−m0|) and x(N)(0) = (1/N)
∑N
j=1 xj(0). 
The rest part of this section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 25. For any given f ∈ L2(0, T ;Rn),
denote the state processes of (3) corresponding to (uˆi, uˆ−i, f) by xˆj , 1 ≤ j ≤ N , and xˆ(N) =
(1/N)
∑N
j=1 xˆj. Denote
˙¯m = (A+G)m¯+Bu¯∗ + f, m¯(0) = m0 (56)
All subsequent lemmas are proved under the assumptions of Theorem 25.
Lemma 26 We have
sup
0≤t≤T,f
E|xˆ(N) − m¯|2 ≤ C(1/N + |x(N)(0)−m0|2).
Proof. Note that
dxˆ(N) = [(A+G)xˆ(N) +Buˆ(N) + f ]dt+ (D/N)
N∑
i=1
dWi.
Therefore,
d(xˆ(N) − m¯) = [(A+G)(xˆ(N) − m¯) +B(uˆ(N) − u¯∗)]dt+ (D/N)
N∑
i=1
dWi.
By linear SDE estimates,
E|xˆ(N)(t)− m¯(t)|2 ≤ C|x(N)(0)−m0|2 + C/N
+ CE
∫ t
0
|uˆ(N)(τ)− u¯∗(τ)|2dτ.
By Theorem 21, the lemma follows. 
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Lemma 27 There exists a constant Cˆ0 independent of N such that
max
1≤i≤N
sup
f
Ji(uˆi, uˆ−i, f) ≤ Cˆ0.
Proof. Denote
dx′i = (Ax
′
i +Buˆi +Gm¯+ f)dt+DdWi, (57)
where x′i(0) = xi(0). By Lemma 26, it is easy to show
sup
0≤t≤T,f
E|xˆi(t)− x′i(t)|2 ≤ C(1/N + |x(N)(0) −m0|2).
We have
Ji(uˆi, uˆ−i, f) ≤ J¯i(uˆi, f) + E
∫ T
0
|(xˆi − x′i) + Γ(m¯− xˆ(N))|2Qdt+ E|xˆi(T )− x′i(T )|2H
+ 2E
∫ T
0
[x′i − (Γm¯+ η)]TQ[(xˆi − x′i) + Γ(m¯− xˆ(N))]dt
+ 2E[x′Ti (T )H(xˆi(T )− x′i(T ))]. (58)
Combining Lemma 6 with condition (ii) in Theorem 25, we obtain
J¯i(uˆi, f) ≤ C − (ǫ0/2)‖f‖2L2 (59)
for ǫ0 > 0, where C does not depend on (i,N). Since neither xˆi− x′i nor m¯− xˆ(N) depend on f , there
exists a constant C1 such that∣∣∣∣E ∫ T
0
[x′i − (Γm¯+ η)]TQ[(xˆi − x′i) + Γ(m¯− xˆ(N))]dt
∣∣∣∣
≤ C1
(
E
∫ T
0
|x′i − (Γm¯+ η)|2Qdt
)1/2
≤ C2(1 + ‖f‖2L2)1/2
≤ C3 + (ǫ0/16)‖f‖2L2 , (60)
where the second inequality follows from elementary estimates based on the solutions of (56) and (57).
Similarly,
E[x′Ti (T )H(xˆi(T )− x′i(T ))] ≤ C4 + (ǫ0/16)‖f‖2L2 . (61)
Finally combining (58)-(61) with Lemma 26 leads to
Ji(uˆi, uˆ−i, f) ≤ C − (ǫ0/4)‖f‖2L2 .
The lemma follows. 
Consider the set of strategies (ui, uˆ−i) and the corresponding state processes
dxi = (Axi +Bui +Gx
(N) + f)dt+DdWi, (62)
dxj = (Axj +Buˆj +Gx
(N) + f)dt+DdWj, 1 ≤ j ≤ N, j 6= i. (63)
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Lemma 28 If ui in (62) satisfies supf Ji(ui, uˆ−i, f) ≤ Cˆ0, there exists Cˆ1 independent of N such that
E
∫ T
0
|ui(t)|2dt ≤ Cˆ1. (64)
Proof. Suppose supf Ji(ui, uˆ−i, f) ≤ Cˆ0. Then for any f ,
E
∫ T
0
(
|xi − (Γx(N) + η)|2Q + uTi Rui −
1
γ
|f(t)|2
)
dt+ E[xTi (T )Hxi(T )] ≤ Cˆ0,
where (x1, · · · , xN ) is generated by (ui, uˆ−i) and f . Taking f = 0, we obtain
E
∫ T
0
(
|xi − (Γx(N) + η)|2Q + uTi Rui
)
dt ≤ Cˆ0.
Therefore, (64) holds. 
Let UCˆ1 denote the set of processes ui ∈ L2F (0, T ;Rn1) which satisfy (64). For (62)-(63), denote
x(N) = (1/N)
∑N
j=1 xj .
Lemma 29 Suppose ui ∈ UCˆ1 in (62). Then
sup
0≤t≤T,f,ui∈UCˆ1
E|x(N)(t)− m¯(t)|2 = O(1/N + |x(N)(0)−m0|2).
Proof. Rewrite (62) in the form
dxi = [Axi +Buˆi +Gx
(N) + f ]dt+B(ui − uˆi)dt+DdWi. (65)
By (63) and (65),
dx(N) = [(A+G)x(N) +Buˆ(N) + f ]dt+
B
N
(ui − uˆi)dt+ D
N
N∑
j=1
dWj ,
which combined with (56) gives
d(x(N) − m¯) = [(A+G)(x(N) − m¯) +B(uˆ(N) − u¯∗)]dt
+
B
N
(ui − uˆi)dt+ D
N
N∑
j=1
dWj .
By Theorem 21 and the fact E
∫ T
0 |ui− uˆi|2 ≤ C for all ui ∈ UCˆ1 , where the constants C do not depend
on (f, ui), elementary SDE estimates lead to
sup
0≤t≤T,f
E|x(N)(t)− m¯(t)|2 ≤ C(1/N + |x(N)(0) −m0|2),
where C does not depend on ui. The lemma follows. 
Lemma 30 For each ui ∈ UCˆ1, supf Ji(ui, uˆ−i, f) is finite and attained by some f depending on ui
and so denoted as fui. Moreover,
sup
ui∈UCˆ1
| sup
f
Ji(ui, uˆ−i, f)− J¯i(ui, fˆui)| = O(1/
√
N + |x(N)(0) −m(0)|),
where fˆui is determined by Theorem 7 for the given ui.
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Proof. Note that we have
dxi = [Axi +Bui +Gm¯+G(x
(N) − m¯) + f ]dt+DdWi, (66)
˙¯m = (A+G)m¯+Bu¯∗ + f,
where m¯(0) = m0. Define the auxiliary process
dx†i = (Ax
†
i +Bui +Gm¯+ f)dt+DdWi,
where x†i (0) = xi(0) and (ui, f,Wi) is the same as in (66). By Lemma 29, it is easy to show
sup
0≤t≤T,f
E|xi(t)− x†i (t)|2 = O(1/N + |x(N)(0)−m(0)|2). (67)
We have the relation
|xi − (Γx(N) + η)|2Q = |x†i − (Γm¯+ η)|2Q + |(xi − x†i ) + Γ(m¯− x(N))|2Q
+ 2[x†i − (Γm¯+ η)]TQ[(xi − x†i ) + Γ(m¯− x(N))].
The cost can be rewritten as
Ji(ui, uˆ−i, f) = J¯i(ui, f) + E
∫ T
0
|(xi − x†i ) + Γ(m¯− x(N))|2Qdt
+ E
[
|xi(T )− x†i (T )|2H
]
+ 2E
∫ T
0
[
x†i − (Γm¯+ η)
]T
Q
[
(xi − x†i ) + Γ(m¯− x(N))
]
dt
+ 2E
[
(x†i (T ))
TH(xi(T )− x†i (T ))
]
(68)
≤ J¯i(ui, f) + C
(
1/N + |x(N)(0)−m0|2
)
+ 2E
∫ T
0
[
x†i − (Γm¯+ η)
]T
Q
[
(xi − x†i ) + Γ(m¯− x(N))
]
dt
+ 2E
[
(x†i (T ))
TH(xi(T )− x†i (T ))
]
, (69)
where the inequality follows from Lemma 29 and (67). Note that neither xi− x†i nor m¯− x(N) in (68)
depend on f . The terms x†i and x
†
i − (Γm¯+η) are affine in f , and −J¯i(ui, f) is convex in f by Lemma
6. Consequently, it follows from (68) that −Ji(ui, uˆ−i, f) is convex in f . For ui ∈ UCˆ1 , in analogue to
(59), we obtain
J¯i(ui, f) ≤ C − (ǫ0/2)‖f‖2L2 , (70)
where C doest not depend on ui. We have∣∣∣∣E ∫ T
0
[
x†i − (Γm¯+ η)
]T
Q
[
(xi − x†i ) + Γ(m¯− x(N))
]
dt
∣∣∣∣
≤
{
E
∫ T
0
|x†i − (Γm¯+ η)|2Qdt
}1/2
·
{
E
∫ T
0
|(xi − x†i ) + Γ(m¯− x(N))|2Qdt
}1/2
≤ C
(
1/
√
N + |x(N)(0)−m0|
)
(1 + ‖f‖2L2)1/2
≤ C + (ǫ0/16)‖f‖2L2 .
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Similarly, ∣∣∣E [(x†i (T ))TH(xi(T )− x†i (T ))]∣∣∣ ≤ C + (ǫ0/16)‖f‖2L2 .
Hence, (69) gives
Ji(ui, uˆ−i, f) ≤ C − (ǫ0/4)‖f‖2L2 , (71)
where C does not depend on (N,ui). So for given ui ∈ UCˆ1 , Ji(ui, uˆ−i, f) attains a finite supreme at
some fui since it is a continuous functional of f , and by (71) we may further find a constant Cˆ2 such
that
sup
ui∈UCˆ1
‖fui‖L2 ≤ Cˆ2. (72)
By (69),
Ji(ui, uˆ−i, f) ≤ J¯i(ui, f) +C(1/N + |x(N)(0)−m0|2)
+ C
(
1/N + |x(N)(0) −m0|2
)1/2(
E
∫ T
0
|x†i − (Γm¯+ η)|2Qdt
)1/2
+ C
(
1/N + |x(N)(0) −m0|2
)1/2 (
E|x†i (T )|2
)1/2
. (73)
Now for ui ∈ UCˆ1 and the resulting fui satisfying (72), we further obtain
E|x†i (T )|2 + E
∫ T
0
|x†i − (Γm¯+ η)|2Qdt ≤ C.
For ui ∈ UCˆ1 , (73) gives
sup
f
Ji(ui, uˆ−i, f) ≤ J¯i(ui, fui) + C(1/
√
N + |x(N)(0)−m0|)
≤ J¯i(ui, fˆui) + C(1/
√
N + |x(N)(0)−m0|),
where fˆui is determined by Theorem 7. Due to (70),
sup
ui∈UCˆ1
‖fˆui‖L2 ≤ C (74)
for some constant C. By (74) and the method in (68), we similarly derive
Ji(ui, uˆ−i, fˆui) ≥ J¯i(ui, fˆui)−C(1/
√
N + |x(N)(0) −m0|).
Hence, for all ui ∈ UCˆ1 ,
sup
f
Ji(ui, uˆ−i, f) ≥ J¯i(ui, fˆui)− C(1/
√
N + |x(N)(0)−m0|).
The constant C in various places does not depend on ui. The lemma follows. 
Proof of Theorem 25. It suffices to show the first inequality by checking ui ∈ UCˆ1 . By Lemma
30, we have
sup
f
Ji(ui, uˆ−i, f) ≥ J¯i(ui, fˆui)− C1(1/
√
N + |x(N)(0)−m0|)
≥ J¯i(uˆi, fˆuˆi)− C1(1/
√
N + |x(N)(0)−m0|). (75)
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On the other hand, by taking the particular control uˆi in Lemma 30,
sup
f
Ji(uˆi, uˆ−i, f) ≤ J¯i(uˆi, fˆuˆi) + C2(1/
√
N + |x(N)(0)−m0|). (76)
Subsequently, (75) and (76) imply
sup
f
Ji(ui, uˆ−i, f) ≥ sup
f
Ji(uˆi, uˆ−i, f)− (C1 + C2)(1/
√
N + |x(N)(0)−m0|).
This completes the proof. 
7 Further Generalization to Random Initial States
This section extends the results to a more general model with random initial states. For agent Ai, its
dynamics are given by
dxoi (t) = (Ax
o
i (t) +Bui(t) +Gx
o(N)(t) + f(t))dt+DdWi(t), 1 ≤ i ≤ N,
where xo(N) = (1/N)
∑N
j=1 x
o
j . The initial states of the agents are given by x
o
i (0) = ξi. As in (4), we
define Ji(ui, u−i, f) by using x
o
j in place of xj , 1 ≤ j ≤ N . Let {Fot }0≤t≤T be the filtration generated
by {ξi,Wi(t), 1 ≤ i ≤ N}, and L2Fo(0, T ;Rk) is defined accordingly.
(H0) The sequence {ξi, i ≥ 1} consists of independent random variables which are also independent
of the Browian motions {Wi, i ≥ 1}. In addition, limN→∞(1/N)
∑N
i=1 Eξi = m0, supi E|ξi|2 ≤ c0 for
some constant c0 independent of N .
For fixed u¯, we consider the FBSDE
dxoi = (Ax
o
i +BR
−1BTyoi +Gm
o
i + γp
o
i )dt+DdWi,
m˙oi = (A+G)m
o
i +Bu¯+ γp
o
i ,
p˙oi = −(A+G)T poi − (I − Γ)TQ[Exoi − (Γmoi + η)],
dyoi =
{−AT yoi +Q[xoi − (Γmoi + η)]} dt+ ζoi dWi,
(77)
where xoi (0) = ξi, m
o
i (0) = m0, p
o
i (T ) = HEx
o
i (T ), and y
o
i (T ) = −Hxoi (T ). Except the random initial
state, this FBSDE has the same form as (36).
For the current situation where the filtration is not generated only by the Brownian motions, the
proof of Lemma 12 is not applicable. The solution procedure of (P2) as presented in Section 3.5 is only
heuristically applied to derive (77). Nevertheless, we can study (77) directly and use it to construct
decentralized strategies. We still define Jwoi (ui, u−i) = supf∈L2(0,T ;Rn) Ji(ui, u−i, f). The next theorem
subsumes Corollary 14 and Theorem 25.
Theorem 31 Assume that (H0)-(H2) hold and (42) has a unique solution (m,p,y). We further take
u¯ = R−1BTy in (77). Then the two assertions hold.
(i) (77) has a unique solution in L2Fo(0, T ;R
n)× C1([0, T ];R2n)× L2Fo(0, T ;R2n).
(ii) For uˆi = R
−1BTyoi , 1 ≤ i ≤ N, we have
Jwoi (uˆi, uˆ−i)− εN ≤ inf
ui∈U
Jwoi (ui, uˆ−i) ≤ Jwoi (uˆi, uˆ−i), (78)
where 0 ≤ εN = O(1/
√
N + |(1/N)∑Nj=1Eξj −m0|).
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Proof. (i) Consider (36) by setting
u¯ = R−1BTy, xi(0) = Eξi. (79)
Further construct the ODE by taking expectation in (36):
˙¯xi = Ax¯i +BR
−1BT y¯i +Gm¯i + γp¯i,
˙¯mi = (A+G)m¯i +Bu¯+ γp¯i,
˙¯pi = −(A+G)T p¯i − (I − Γ)TQ[x¯i − (Γm¯i + η)],
˙¯yi = −AT y¯i +Q[x¯i − (Γm¯i + η)],
(80)
where x¯i(0) = Eξi, m¯i(0) = m0, p¯i(T ) = Hx¯i(T ), and y¯i(T ) = −Hx¯i(T ). Since (36) subject to (79)
has a unique solution, (80) has a solution in C1([0, T ];R4n). If (80) has two different solutions, we will
be able to construct two different solutions to (36) satisfying (79), a contradiction to Theorem 13. So
(80) has a unique solution (x¯i, m¯i, p¯i, y¯i).
Setting (moi , p
o
i ) = (m¯i, p¯i) in the first and last equations of (77), we construct the new equations{
dxoi = (Ax
o
i +BR
−1BT yoi +Gm¯i + γp¯i)dt+DdWi,
dyoi =
{−ATyoi +Q[xoi − (Γm¯i + η)]} dt+ ζoi dWi, (81)
where xoi (0) = ξi and y
o
i (T ) = −Hxoi (T ). Let P be the solution of the Riccati equation (B.4) and take
the transformation yoi = −Pxoi + φ. We obtain
dφ =
[−(A−BR−1BTP )Tφ+ P (Gm¯i + γp¯i)−Q(Γm¯i + η)] dt+ (ζoi + PD)dWi,
where φ(T ) = 0. We solve (φ, ζoi ) ∈ L2F (0, T ;R2n), and further obtain (xoi , yoi ) ∈ L2Fo(0, T ;R2n).
Subsequently, we can show Exoi = x¯i. Hence (x
o
i ,m
o
i , p
o
i , y
o
i , ζ
o
i ) satisfies (77). By taking the variation
of the first three equations of (77) and applying an optimal control interpretation as in proving
Theorem 13, we can show that (xoi ,m
o
i , p
o
i , y
o
i , ζ
o
i ) is the unique solution.
(ii) By slightly modifying the proofs of Theorem 18 and the associated lemmas, we can show
sup
0≤t≤T
E|uˆ(N) − u¯∗|2 = O(1/N) +O(|Ex(N)(0)−m0|2).
Next, we adapt the proofs of Lemmas 26-30 taking into account the random initial states satisfying
(H0). This gives the desired estimate for εN . 
8 Conclusion
This paper introduces a class of mean field LQG games with drift uncertainty. By using the idea
of robust optimization, the local strategy is designed by minimizing the worst case cost. When the
decentralized strategies are implemented in a finite population, their performance is characterized as
a robust ε-Nash equilibrium.
In this paper we only deal with drift uncertainty. If the Brownian motions are also subject to
an uncertain coefficient process to model volatility uncertainty [38], the resulting optimal control
problems will give a set of more complicated FBSDE. It is also of potential interest to address model
uncertainty of the mean field game in a different setup by considering measure uncertainty [16, 36, 48]
in the robust optimization problem. This will necessitate the use of different techniques for analysis.
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Appendix A
For proving Lemma 9, we give another lemma first. Consider an auxiliary optimal control problem
with dynamics 
z˙i = Azi +Bvi +Gz + γq,
z˙ = (A+G)z + γq,
q˙ = −(A+G)T q − (I − Γ)TQ(Ezi − Γz),
(A.1)
where zi(0) = z(0) = 0, q(T ) = HEzi(T ) and vi ∈ L2F (0, T ;Rn1). Following the argument in the proof
of Lemma 8, under (H1) we can show the existence and uniqueness of a solution to (A.1). The optimal
control problem is
(P2b) minimize J¯bi (vi) = E
∫ T
0
{|zi − Γz|2Q + vTi Rvi − γ|q(t)|2} dt+ E|zi(T )|2H .
Similarly, we may define positive definiteness of J¯bi as in Section 3.
Lemma A.1 J¯ai is positive semi-definite (resp., positive definite) if and only if J¯
b
i is positive semi-
definite (resp., positive definite).
Proof. If suffices to show the “only if” part.
Suppose that J¯ai is positive semi-definite. Consider any control vi ∈ L2F (0, T ;Rn1) for J¯bi , and this
gives a unique solution (zi, z, q). We take expectation in (A.1) to obtain
˙¯zi = Az¯i +Bv¯i +Gz + γq,
z˙ = (A+G)z + γq,
q˙ = −(A+G)T q − (I − Γ)TQ(z¯i − Γz),
where z¯i = Ezi and v¯i = Evi.
It follows that
J¯bi (vi) = J¯
a
i (v¯i) + E
∫ T
0
[|zi − Ezi|2Q + |vi − Evi|2R] dt+ E|zi(T )− Ezi(T )|2H
≥ J¯ai (v¯i) ≥ 0.
On the other hand, J¯ai (0) = 0. This shows that J¯
b
i is positive semi-definite. The above reasoning is
also valid for the positive definite case. This proves the “only if” part. 
Proof of Lemma 9. Let (xi,mi, pi) and (x
′
i,m
′
i, p
′
i) be two state processes in (P2) corresponding to
the controls ui and u
′
i, respectively. Assume λ1 ∈ [0, 1] and λ1 + λ2 = 1. We have
λ1J¯i(ui) + λ2J¯i(u
′
i)− J¯i(λ1ui + λ2u′i)
= λ1λ2E
∫ T
0
{|xi − x′i − Γ(mi −m′i)|2Q + |ui − u′i|2R − γ|pi(t)− p′i(t)|2} dt
+ λ1λ2E|xi(T )− x′i(T )|2H .
Denote zi = xi − x′i, z = mi −m′i, q = pi − p′i and vi = ui − u′i. It is obvious
λ1J¯i(ui) + λ2J¯i(u
′
i)− J¯i(λ1ui + λ2u′i) = λ1λ2J¯bi (vi).
Recalling Lemma A.1, this completes the proof. 
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Appendix B
We introduce the FBSDE
dxi = (Axi +BR
−1BT yi +Gmi + γpi)dt+DdWi,
m˙i = (A+G)mi +BR
−1BTEyi + γpi,
p˙i = −(A+G)T pi − (I − Γ)TQ[mi − (Γmi + η)],
dyi =
{−AT yi +Q[xi − (Γmi + η)]} dt+ ζidWi,
(B.1)
where xi(0) = mi(0) = m0, pi(T ) = Hmi(T ), and yi(T ) = −Hxi(T ). This FBSDE is slightly different
from (42) by the third equation and the condition on pi(T ) and will be more convenient for analysis.
The next lemma shows that the two equation systems (43) and (B.1) are equivalent. The proof is
straightforward since Exi and mi satisfy the same ODE with the same initial condition.
Lemma B.1 If (xi,mi, pi, yi, ζi) ∈ S[0, T ] satisfies one of (43) and (B.1), it also satisfies the other. 
Consider the ODE system
˙¯xi = Ax¯i +BR
−1BT y¯i +Gm¯i + γp¯i,
˙¯mi = (A+G)m¯i +BR
−1BT y¯i + γp¯i,
˙¯pi = −(A+G)T p¯i − (I − Γ)TQ[m¯i − (Γm¯i + η)],
˙¯yi = −AT y¯i +Q[x¯i − (Γm¯i + η)],
(B.2)
where x¯i(0) = m¯i(0) = m0, p¯i(T ) = Hm¯i(T ) and y¯i(T ) = −Hx¯i(T ).
Lemma B.2 The two statements are equivalent:
(i) The FBSDE (B.1) has a unique solution in S[0, T ].
(ii) The ODE (B.2) has a unique solution in C1([0, T ];R4n).
Proof. Step 1. Suppose that (ii) holds and let the unique solution be denoted by (x¯i, m¯i, p¯i, y¯i).
Take (mi, pi) = (m¯i, p¯i) on the right hand side of the first and last equations of (B.1) to write{
dxi = (Axi +BR
−1BTyi +Gm¯i + γp¯i)dt+DdWi,
dyi =
{−AT yi +Q[xi − (Γm¯i + η)]} dt+ ζidWi, (B.3)
where yi(T ) = −Hxi(T ). Denote the Riccati equation
P˙ +ATP + PA− PBR−1BTP +Q = 0, P (T ) = H, (B.4)
which has a unique solution on [0, T ]. Setting yi = −Pxi+ φ in (B.3), we obtain two decoupled equa-
tions for (xi, φ) which is uniquely solved. This further gives a unique solution (xi, yi, ζi) ∈ L2F (0, T ;R3n)
for (B.3). Taking expectation on both sides of (B.3) yields{
d
dtExi = AExi +BR
−1BTEyi +Gm¯i + γp¯i,
d
dtEyi = −ATEyi +Q[Exi − (Γm¯i + η)],
(B.5)
where Eyi(T ) = −HExi(T ). By combining (B.5) with the first and fourth equations of (B.2), it is
easy to show Exi = x¯i and Eyi = y¯i for all t ∈ [0, T ]. This implies
˙¯mi = (A+G)m¯i +BR
−1BT y¯i + γp¯i
= (A+G)m¯i +BR
−1BTEyi + γp¯i.
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The third equation of (B.1) is clearly satisfied by (m¯i, p¯i). Therefore, (xi,mi, pi, yi, ζi) := (xi, m¯i, p¯i, yi, ζi)
satisfies (B.1).
We continue to show that (xi,mi, pi, yi, ζi) above is the unique solution of (B.1). Suppose that
(x′i,m
′
i, p
′
i, y
′
i, ζ
′
i) is another solution of (B.1). It is clear that (Ex
′
i,m
′
i, p
′
i,Ey
′
i) is a solution of (B.2).
Since (B.2) has a unique solution (x¯i, m¯i, p¯i, y¯i), we have (m
′
i, p
′
i) = (m¯i, p¯i). By using the first and
fourth equations of (B.1), we derive the equations satisfied by (x′i − xi, y′i − yi) and further infer
(x′i, y
′
i) = (xi, yi). We conclude that (i) holds.
Step 2. Suppose that (i) holds with the unique solution denoted by (xi,mi, pi, yi, ζi). It is ob-
vious that (x¯i, m¯i, p¯i, y¯i) := (Exi,mi, pi,Eyi) is a solution of (B.2). Suppose that (x¯
′
i, m¯
′
i, p¯
′
i, y¯
′
i) 6=
(x¯i, m¯i, p¯i, y¯i) is another solution of (B.2). Then (xi,mi, pi, yi, ζi)+ (x¯
′
i− x¯i, m¯′i− m¯i, p¯′i− p¯i, y¯′i− y¯i, 0)
is also a solution of (B.1), a contradiction to (i). So (B.2) has a unique solution. 
Lemma B.3 (i) If (x¯i, m¯i, p¯i, y¯i) is a solution of (B.2), (m,p,y) := (m¯i, p¯i, y¯i) satisfies (42).
(ii) If (m,p,y) is a solution of (42), there exists x¯i such that (x¯i, m¯i, p¯i, y¯i) := (x¯i,m,p,y) satisfies
(B.2).
(iii) The ODE (B.2) has a unique solution if and only if (42) has a unique solution.
Proof. (i) If (x¯i, m¯i, p¯i, y¯i) is a solution of (B.2), x¯i = m¯i and therefore y¯i(T ) = −Hx¯i(T ) =
−Hm¯i(T ). So (m,p,y) defined above satisfies (42).
(ii) If (m,p,y) is a solution of (42), we set (m¯i, p¯i, y¯i) = (m,p,y) and define x¯i by the ODE
˙¯xi = Ax¯i +BR
−1BT y¯i +Gm¯i + γp¯i,
where x¯i(0) = m0. It can be checked that m¯i = x¯i, which gives y¯i(T ) = −Hm¯i(T ) = −Hx¯i(T ).
Hence, (x¯i, m¯i, p¯i, y¯i) is a solution to (B.2).
(iii) Assume that (42) has a unique solution. Let (x¯i, m¯i, p¯i, y¯i) and (x¯
′
i, m¯
′
i, p¯
′
i, y¯
′
i) be two solutions
of (B.2). By (i), (m¯i, p¯i, y¯i) and (m¯
′
i, p¯
′
i, y¯
′
i) are two solutions of (42) and so must be equal, which
further implies x¯i = x¯
′
i by the first equation of (B.2). This shows that (B.2) has a unique solution.
Next assume that (B.2) has a unique solution. Let (m,p,y) and (m′,p′,y′) be two solutions of
(42). By (ii), we must have (m,p,y) = (m′,p′,y′). Therefore, (42) has a unique solution. 
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